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United States workforce includes over eight million undocumented immigrants.2
They work in the shadows to evade deportation, and they accept jobs and working conditions that their documented counterparts will not accept. As invisible as their dayto-day work may be, undocumented workers are an integral, though unsanctioned, part of
the u.s. economy. They build our houses, tend our crops, and slaughter our livestock. They help satiate the American
craving for affordable abundance. At the same time, unauthorized immigrants are not supposed to be here, and their
mere presence undermines our understanding of community and membership. Relied upon but unwelcome, among us
but uninvited, undocumented workers labor on the border of inclusion and exclusion and are the subjects of a series of
challenging questions: Should undocumented workers enjoy the same workplace protections that authorized workers
enjoy? When and how much should immigration status matter? Does being here count for anything? Who belongs?

Who is a member?

Unfortunately, the answers to these
questions are less than clear. For much of
u.s. history, undocumented workers have
enjoyed many of the same rights that u.s.
citizens have enjoyed by virtue of mere presence within u.s. territory. Recently, however, some undocumented workers have
found that they cannot effectively enforce
many of their statutorily protected employment rights, including the right to participate in union organizing activities, work
in a discrimination-free environment, and
be compensated for work-related injuries.
Undocumented workers, it seems, are not
considered full “members” of the employment protection franchise. Although this
trend is not surprising given rising concern
and anger over the large number of undocumented immigrants filling u.s. jobs, the
denial of membership rights to individuals
based solely on unauthorized status is actually a significant deviation from the theory
of membership developing in broader u.s.
law. Outside of the employment sphere,
courts are not looking to status to determine membership. Rather, they are increasingly affording rights to individuals based
on more fundamental indicators of membership including an individual’s ties to the
surrounding community and subjection
to u.s.-imposed obligations. Here, I argue
that the distribution of employment-related
rights should conform to this emerging,
more nuanced approach, not merely for the
sake of a consistently applicable membership
theory but to avoid the draconian incentives
produced by effectively denying undocumented immigrants work-related rights.

I. The Concept of Membership
The distribution of rights, regardless of
type, boils down to a single question: Who
belongs? This question follows naturally
from the assumption that members—those
who belong—deserve a certain type of
treatment, and those who are not members
deserve another. In that sense, the distribution of membership rights is as much about
determining who does not belong as it is
about determining who does belong.
Two competing mechanisms or theories
for sorting members from nonmembers have
historically coexisted in the United States:
the territorial approach and the status-based
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approach. Broadly speaking, the status-based
approach distributes membership rights based
on an individual’s legal status. Under such a
conception of membership, undocumented
immigrants have no formal, consensual relationship with the state and therefore are not
members, while citizens enjoy the full suite
of rights available. In contrast, territoriality
distributes membership rights and benefits
according to geographic boundaries without
regard to legal status. Under a territorial
approach, individuals within the state boundaries are members entitled to all rights offered
by the state, while individuals outside the
state boundaries have no guaranteed rights.
Territoriality enjoys wide support in the
academic community, no doubt because of
its broad inclusiveness. However, skeptics
have challenged territoriality’s theoretical
underpinnings, and the challenge is not an
easy one to meet. What is it about territorial
presence that requires the distribution of full
membership rights? Why reward territorial
presence at all? Territoriality’s supporters offer
three potential responses to these questions.
COMMUNITY PRESERVATION

One potential rationale for territoriality is the
community preservation rationale. Under this
rationale, equality of membership is important, not because all individuals deserve membership rights equally, but because equality of
membership preserves the nature of the community. This argument is not about fairness
to strangers, but it is about preservation of a
system, i.e., egalitarianism is worth preserving, not because newcomers to the territory
deserve to be treated as equals, but because
those who were already here desire to live in
an egalitarian community and do not want to
risk becoming a part of a future subclass of
residents. Under this rationale, even an individual’s consent to substandard treatment
could not justify unequal treatment because
the effect would be the same—the perpetuation of a second-class caste.
Community preservation explains various scholars’ and courts’ espousal of territoriality. Owen Fiss, for example, has argued that
the principle of self-preservation is implicit in
the Fourteenth Amendment as “a statement
about how society wishes to organize itself,
and prohibits subjugation, even voluntary
subjugation, because such a practice would

disfigure society.”3 Indeed, “[w]e ought not to
subjugate immigrants, not because we owe
them anything, but to preserve our society as
a community of equals.”4
MUTUALITY OF OBLIGATI O N

A second possible rationale for territoriality
is the mutuality of obligation rationale: the
state owes individuals within the territory
membership rights because those individuals are subject to the obligations imposed by
the state. Under this rationale, territorial
presence evidences the individual’s acceptance of the state’s jurisdiction over her. This
concept flows from Westphalian notions
of territorial sovereignty under which the
nation-state is a unitary, self-contained actor
with complete and exclusive jurisdiction over
the people within its territory. Under such a
system, no state may act within the boundaries of another sovereign nation-state. Thus, a
nation-state may only impose obligations on
and protect the population within its territorial borders. If a nation-state can only apply
its rules within its territorial boundaries, then
where an individual resides, rather than who
the individual is, determines which rules apply.
That is, presence within the nation-state’s territory determines an individual’s obligations.
The nation-state, in turn, affords those individuals whatever membership rights and benefits it has undertaken to provide residents.
The mutuality of obligation rationale
for territoriality makes perfect sense in a
purely Westphalian system. The reality,
however, is that states often do impose obligations outside their borders and selectively
suspend obligations within their own territory. Embassies, for example, function as
islands of immunity from the obligations
imposed by the host state within its territory even though embassies operate within
the host state’s territory. States also routinely
pass laws to govern the acts of their nationals abroad. This incongruous relationship
between modern notions of jurisdiction
have led some to call for the rejection of territoriality and the adoption of a model based
entirely on mutuality of obligation.
COMMUNITY TIES

Many have defended territoriality based on
a community ties rationale. Under this view

of territoriality, territorial presence serves as
an indicator of an individual’s ties to other
individuals and entities within the territorial
boundaries of the state. This view of territoriality is attractive in its recognition of real
human relationships as a basic social fabric,
but the question remains: What is it about
the existence of human relationships that
requires the bestowal of membership rights?
One answer is that an individual’s ties
to the surrounding community foster commitment and loyalty to the surrounding
community. As an individual becomes
dependent on her surrounding community,
her personal interests align with those of
the community. The individual is therefore
more likely to make valuable contributions
to the community and refrain from harming
it in order to augment her own existence
within the community. Affording membership rights to such an individual rewards
her contribution.
Another answer is that as strangers
develop ties to the surrounding community, they begin to help define the character of the community. In other words,
not only do the individual’s ties to the
community merit the individual’s inclusion as a member, but the community’s ties to
the individual require inclusion of that individual. By including such an individual,
the state preserves the community’s character, which is a function of its members’
social affiliations. This argument is merely
a restatement of what I have termed the
community preservation rationale. That
is, those who are members owe individuals who have formed ties to the community
nothing. Rather, they owe it to the community—to themselves—to preserve those
ties and the community built on those ties.
Despite the appeal of the community
ties rationale, it does not hold up well in
practice. First, in today’s world, ties to other
individuals and entities do not necessarily depend on physical proximity. In fact,
as the popularity of Internet-based social
networking sites suggests, individuals may
easily maintain affiliations with individuals in other countries. It is also entirely possible for an individual to have very few
affiliations with those inside the country in
which she resides. Moreover, even where
an individual does have ties to others within
the same nation-state, these affiliations may

stem from a shared interest, familial ties, or
professional obligations, rather than from
physical proximity.
Second, territoriality’s binary conception of members and nonmembers—in
which those within the territory are full
members and those outside the territory
receive nothing—does not coincide with
this affiliations-focused rationale. The types,
depth, and number of community ties vary
by individual. Community ties distribute
across a spectrum, not on a binary toggle.
Is there a threshold number and type of connections required of a “member”? If community ties underlie territoriality, shouldn’t
an individual with more connection to the
surrounding community have a greater claim
on membership rights than one whose only
connection to the surrounding community
is mere presence in it?

II. Territoriality’s Metamorphosis
Courts have begun to recognize territoriality’s failure to always produce results consistent with its underlying rationales. Territorial
presence, it turns out, is an inadequate proxy
for the more fundamental indicators of
membership encompassed by territoriality’s
underlying rationales. While a century ago
u.s. courts held territorial presence to be an
inviolable guarantee of many membership
rights, strict territoriality has recently begun
to wane. Instead of distributing rights based
exclusively on an individual’s territorial presence, modern courts have begun to distribute
rights to individuals only where consistent
with the rationales of territoriality. Thus, territoriality is undergoing a transformation; in
this new conception of membership, which I
call the “postterritorial” approach; courts are
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shedding their preoccupation with geography and focusing on mutuality of obligation,
community preservation, and community
ties as the driving forces behind the distribution of membership rights.
Territoriality’s metamorphosis has gained
momentum only in the last several decades.
In early u.s. history, being present in the
United States categorically secured a great
deal of membership rights for aliens within
the United States, although the rationale for
a territorial distribution of rights remained
undeveloped for many years. In Yick Wo v.
Hopkins,5 for example, the Supreme Court
emphatically proclaimed, without explanation, that the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees “are universal in their application, to
all persons within the territorial jurisdiction,
without regard to any differences of race, of
color, or of nationality.”6 In the years following Yick Wo, the Court routinely held that
immigrants, even those that were not lawfully within u.s. territory, were entitled to
membership rights by virtue of their presence
within u.s. borders.7 However, the rationale
for such a territorial conception of membership remained vague.
It was not until a century later, and perhaps due to increasing concerns about the
wisdom of offering constitutional rights to
undocumented immigrants, that the Court
offered a detailed defense of territoriality’s guarantee of membership rights to all
within the national territory. In Plyler v. Doe,8
the Court invalidated a Texas statute that
allowed local public schools to deny enrollment to undocumented children. Those children, the Court reasoned, were within the
United States and therefore entitled to the
equal protection of Texas law. In arriving at
that conclusion, the Court offered a mutuality of obligation rationale for territoriality.
The Court reasoned that Texas was under an
obligation to protect all those upon whom it
could impose obligations—all individuals
within Texas borders. As a second rationale
for territoriality, the Court emphasized the
need to preserve the national community’s
character. The Court reasoned that education “has a fundamental role in maintaining
the fabric of our society.”9 According to the
Court, we must afford unauthorized immigrants a public education in order to preserve
“a democratic system of government,”10
ensure that individuals will be able to “lead
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economically productive lives to the benefit
of us all,”11 and “sustain[] our political and cultural heritage. . . .”12
Some of the first hints that territorial presence would no longer categorically
guarantee rights to aliens within u.s. territory appeared just a few years after Plyler
in Verdugo-Urquidez.13 There, the Supreme
Court, in a plurality opinion, suggested
that territorial presence may not be enough
for some membership rights to attach. The
Court’s opinion boldly recharacterized Yick
Wo and its progeny: “These cases . . . establish only that aliens receive constitutional
protections when they have come within the
territory of the United States and developed
substantial connections with this country.”14 The
defendant in Verdugo, a Mexican national
who had been brought to the United States
against his will while u.s. law enforcement
agents searched his house in Mexico without
a warrant, had not established such connections: “[T]his sort of presence—lawful but
involuntary—is not of the sort to indicate
any substantial connection with our country.”15 The Court stopped short of requiring
an individual to have significant community
ties in the u.s. as a prerequisite to the enjoyment of membership rights, but its language
certainly suggested that affiliations might be
indicative of membership within the u.s.
Territoriality’s transformation is perhaps most obvious in Supreme Court precedent determining the rights of individuals
outside u.s. borders. While strict territoriality would categorically exclude such individuals from the distribution of membership
rights, the Supreme Court has recently
rejected strict territoriality in favor of a
more functional, postterritorial approach.
This is a significant departure from early
precedent. In Ross,16 a seminal case that governed u.s. law for several decades, the Court
denied that a sailor on a u.s. merchant ship
had a Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial,
even though he had been tried by a u.s. consular court in Japan: “[t]he Constitution can
have no operation in another country.”17
Notably, the Court defended the territorially based denial of constitutional rights
based on the absence of mutual obligations
between the petitioner and the u.s. government. The Court suggested that a government has no obligation to an individual
outside its own territory because the state

cannot impose any obligations upon individuals abroad. Rather, the u.s.’s only obligation was to Japan to conduct its consular
affairs on mutually agreed terms.
Reid v. Covert,18 decided more than 70
years later, signaled a shift in the Supreme
Court’s approach. There, the Court held
that two u.s. citizens living abroad and convicted by a u.s. military court for the murder of their husbands enjoyed the right to a
trial by jury and indictment by a grand jury.
Backtracking on its reasoning in Ross, the
Court suggested that mutuality of obligation
did require the u.s. to offer the defendants
the requested membership rights. The Court
reasoned that when the u.s. enforces obligations on citizens abroad, it must also offer
corresponding protections: “[W]e reject the
idea that when the United States acts against
citizens abroad it can do so free of the Bill of
Rights. . . . When the Government reaches
out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the
shield which the Bill of Rights and other
parts of the Constitution provide to protect
his life and liberty should not be stripped
away just because he happens to be in
another land.”19
Reid rejected strict territoriality in favor
of an approach based on mutuality of obligation. While much of the Reid opinion
focused on the defendants’ u.s. citizenship
as the cornerstone of mutual obligation
(and therefore suggested that a status-based
approach to membership would govern), the
Court’s recent opinion in Boumediene v. Bush20
indicated that aliens, too, may enjoy some
Constitutional protection outside of u.s.
borders. In Boumediene, the Court squarely
faced a question of membership—of which
membership model to apply to determine
whether enemy combatant detainees held
at Guantanamo Bay were members for
purposes of enjoying a right to the writ of
habeas and the protections of the Suspension
Clause. In its lengthy opinion, the Court
struggled to define the contours of membership, acknowledging that formal status and
territorial presence within the u.s. were traditional indicators of membership.
However, despite the detainees’ lack of
status and territorial presence, the Court
held that Congress could not deny them the
privilege of habeas corpus without complying with the Suspension Clause. In rejecting a strictly territorial approach, the Court

observed that the u.s. was the sole entity
imposing its laws at the naval station. No
other government had effective jurisdiction
over Guantanamo Bay. Thus, there was no
reason the United States could not, in practice, afford constitutional protections to the
detainees. In effect, the Court highlighted
territoriality’s failure to preserve the notion
of mutual obligations. The Court’s argument can, in part, be read as a critique of
Westphalian notions of territoriality: since
governments can and do impose obligations
abroad, they also can and ought to afford
corresponding protections: “Even when the
United States acts outside its borders, its
powers are . . . subject ‘to such restrictions as
are expressed in the Constitution.’”21
A bird’s-eye view of territoriality’s role
in u.s. law suggests that strict territoriality may not survive into the next century.
This is not to say that territory no longer
matters; it does. But territory no longer
defines relationships in the way it once did,
nor does territory pose the impenetrable
barrier of sovereignty and exclusive jurisdiction idealized by Westphalian territorial
preeminence. Territorial presence is thus
no longer a consistently adequate proxy for
fundamental indicators of membership. In
territoriality’s stead, a more flexible postterritorial membership approach is emerging in which membership is not based on
the fiction that territorial presence signifies membership in a society but on actual indicators of membership—community
ties and mutuality of obligation—as well
as an effort to preserve the character of the
national community. Courts are looking to
the rationales that historically justified territoriality and evaluating membership with
direct reference to those rationales. In that
sense, territoriality is not dying; it is making a transformation to keep up with the
realities of modernity. Thus, courts are now
asking and will likely increasingly be asking
whether an individual (or class of individuals) (1) has significant and substantial ties
to the surrounding community and (2) is
subject to u.s. law in a way that triggers the
u.s. government’s reciprocal obligations.
However, even where an individual does
not seem to evidence these two aspects of
membership, courts will need to evaluate
whether denying rights will threaten the
character of u.s. society.

III. Territoriality’s Demise in the
Employment Sphere: Where Work
and Borders Collide
Given strict territoriality’s decline in u.s.
law, it should come as no surprise that
with respect to employment-related rights,
immigrants can no longer solely rely on
their territorial presence to secure protections. However, territoriality’s decline
in the employment sphere has not followed
the same trajectory that territoriality has
followed outside the employment sphere.
In employment-related cases, courts are not
focusing on the rationales underlying territoriality to distribute membership rights.
Rather, in this realm, territoriality is giving
way to the status-based membership model
rather than to the developing postterritorial
model discussed above. For documented
workers, this poses no obstacle to the enjoyment of employment rights, as authorized
status secures membership rights under the
status-based model. Undocumented workers, however, having no legal status under
the law, have increasingly found themselves
excluded from the effective enjoyment of
many employment-related rights.
It was the Supreme Court’s 2002 decision in Hoffman Plastics22 that solidified the
status-based model’s encroachment into the
employment sphere. There, the petitioner,
Castro, had been unlawfully fired from his
job because he was engaging in union organizing efforts, an activity protected under
the National Labor Relations Act. Castro
brought a claim for back pay (payment for
work that would have been done if not for
the unlawful termination of employment).
However, during the resolution of his claim,
Castro admitted he had no authorization to
work in the United States and that he had
secured employment at Hoffman with a
fraudulent Social Security card. The Supreme
Court acknowledged that Castro was protected under the National Labor Relations
Act by virtue of his presence in the United
States, but it refused to award Castro back
pay. The Court reasoned that awarding back
pay would run counter to the Immigration
Reform and Control Act’s underlying policy
of preventing the employment of undocumented immigrants. (Passed in 1986, irca
imposes civil and criminal penalties on

employers who knowingly hire or continue to
employ unauthorized workers.) Castro’s only
remedy—and Hoffman’s only sanction—was
an order to cease and desist from engaging in
violations of the nlra and to post a notice of
that order at Castro’s former work site.
The Hoffman majority opinion highlights
the duality of the undocumented worker’s
position in the workplace. Undocumented
workers labor on the border of the territorial
and status-based models. By recognizing that
undocumented workers present in the United
States are “employees” covered under the
nlra, the Supreme Court offered a measure
of inclusion and membership to Castro and all
undocumented workers. However, Castro’s
membership ended there. Castro’s status as
an undocumented immigrant foreclosed back
pay because, under irca, Castro could not
legally have worked at Hoffman during the
period for which back pay was awarded.
Hoffman has added a new dimension
to both federal and state employment law
litigation. Immigration status has now
become a relevant factor in the distribution of various employment rights in many
jurisdictions. In Escobar v. Spartan Security
Service,23 for example, the court held that
back pay was not available to a claimant
who had been undocumented at the time
of his employer’s alleged sexual harassment, sexual discrimination, and retaliation
even though the claimant had since gained
authorization to work legally in the u.s.
Similarly, a federal district court in Florida
held that the estate of an undocumented
employee injured in a forklift accident
could not recover lost u.s. wages in its
claim against the forklift manufacturer.24
Citing Hoffman, the court reasoned that
lost wage compensation was sufficiently
like the back pay denied in Hoffman for
the court to find that immigration status
precluded its award to an undocumented
worker: “Awarding lost wages is akin to
compensating an employee for work to
be performed. This Court cannot sanction
such a result.”25 In what is likely the most
expansive view of Hoffman, a Virginia court
ordered a worker’s compensation claimant to respond to the employer’s discovery
request regarding immigration status.26
Citing Hoffman, the court held that the
claimant’s immigration status was relevant,
not merely to the remedies available, but to
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Undocumented
workers
contribute to
a collective
effort and add
value to an
enterprise.
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the claimant’s qualification to bring suit at
all: “Essentially, Plaintiff’s argument that he
is entitled to make a workers’ compensation
claim, even if he is an illegal alien, is ‘foreclosed by federal immigration policy. . . .’”27
The fractured view of membership
widely applied to the distribution of employment rights and benefits creates significant
concerns on many levels. Perhaps most disturbing, the Hoffman approach to undocumented workers undermines federal immigration policy, the very issue with which the
majority claimed to be concerned. As many
have argued, the exclusion of unauthorized
immigrants from labor protections is likely to
create incentives for employers to continue
hiring unauthorized workers. First, removing
back pay as an available remedy for the violation of any employee’s employment rights
severely diminishes an employer’s incentive to

fulfill its employment obligations. The remedies approved by the majority in Hoffman,
an order that the employer cease and desist
its illegal conduct and post a notice to
employees of the nlra violation, are a small
price to pay for improper termination of an
employee. With no remedy to enforce an
ostensibly legally ensured right, employees
will have little incentive to report their
employers’ labor law violations, especially
where employers threaten to expose an
undocumented worker’s legal status during
litigation. As a result, undocumented workers will have little option but to continue
working under substandard conditions.
This, in turn, encourages the hiring of
undocumented workers, a practice specifically prohibited by irca and ostensibly the
very focus of irca. As the Hoffman dissenters
recognized, the denial of back pay “lowers
the cost to the employer of an initial labor law
violation. . . . It thereby increases the employer’s incentive to find and to hire illegal-alien
employees” or at least encourages employers
to hire “with a wink and a nod those potentially unlawful aliens whose unlawful employment (given the Court’s views) ultimately will
lower the costs of labor law violations.”28
In addition, the reverse incentives created by the failure to afford equal remedies to
undocumented immigrants erode workplace
standards for all employees, especially where
undocumented workers compose a high
percentage of the workforce. Where undocumented workers are readily available and
easily coerced into remaining quiet about
labor law violations, documented workers,
too, will be reluctant to report those violations out of a fear of being replaced by an
undocumented worker or as a result of pressure from undocumented coworkers who
do not want to risk exposure of immigration status. Statistics suggest this dynamic
may indeed be present: industries in which
undocumented workers compose a high percentage of employees (which are often the
most dangerous and lowest paying industries) exhibit a high incidence of wage and
hour law violations.
In addition to the troubling incentives created by the use of a status-based approach to
deny employment-related rights and benefits
to undocumented workers, the status-based
approach is inconsistent with the emerging postterritorial approach to membership

emerging outside of the employment sphere.
Territoriality’s trajectory in the employment
sphere represents a stray branch in the overall
trajectory of membership theory within u.s.
law. While outside the employment sphere
territoriality is undergoing a transformation
into a more principled, nuanced membership
approach, territoriality as it has historically
applied in the employment sphere is giving
way to an even more formalistic approach. To
avoid the undesirable incentives created by the
use of a status-based model in the employment
sphere and to bring the distribution of membership rights within the employment sphere
in line with territoriality’s broader transformation, courts must begin to employ the emerging postterritorial approach to distribute
employment-related rights.
Under the developing postterritorial
approach to membership, undocumented
workers, as a category, are members of the
employment sphere entitled to the full distribution of membership rights available in
that sphere. First, undocumented workers
have significant affiliations with their surrounding community. Their employment,
alone, ensures the existence of these ties.
Undocumented workers contribute to a collective effort and add value to an enterprise.
Their employers and the broader economy rely
on undocumented workers to perform what
are often undesirable and dangerous tasks that
few authorized workers care to perform.
Second, the principle of mutuality of
obligation further suggests that undocumented workers, despite their lack of
work authorization, are members entitled
to full membership rights. On one level,
and as articulated in Boumediene, the only
law that applies to undocumented workers in the United States is u.s. law, and the
government must not impose obligations
upon undocumented immigrants without
also affording corresponding protections.
But on a more specific level, the relationship between employee and employer is
one of reciprocal obligations. An employee
subjects herself to the requirements and
instructions of an employer on the express
assumption that the employee will abide
by legally imposed standards. To allow an
employer to circumvent these standards by
denying undocumented immigrants certain
remedies is to approve of the employer’s
refusal to fulfill its reciprocal obligations to

an employee—it allows employers to govern
employees without legal constraint.
Third, and perhaps most important, the
failure to enforce the rights of the undocumented worker is likely to create a subcaste
of workers without enforceable rights. Aside
from leaving a group of residents without
full legal recourse for blatant violations
of employment rights, this threatens our
societal norms of equal rights in the workplace and ultimately endangers the rights
of authorized workers and citizens. Absent
full protection for undocumented workers,
employment standards could be weighed
down by the sheer number of undocumented
immigrants working under subpar conditions. A bifurcated system of employment
protections in which one group enjoys more
remedies than the other cannot be sustained
for long; such a system brings to mind
Thomas Jefferson’s warning against the passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts: “The
friendless alien has indeed been selected as
the safest subject of a first experiment; but
the citizen will soon follow. . . .”29

IV. Conclusion
The increasing presence of undocumented
workers in the u.s. labor force poses challenging questions for courts and elected officials
about the meaning of immigration status,
presence in the United States, and, as I have
argued here, the broader concept of membership. I do not claim to have all the answers
to these questions. Rather, my hope is that
I have given a larger context to questions
surrounding undocumented workers, and
more broadly, undocumented immigrants.
Membership rights can be distributed many
different ways. It is important that the u.s.
choice of a membership approach be a deliberate, conscientious choice that furthers our
overall policies and goals rather than the
result of a hasty reaction to surging unauthorized immigration. In the employment sphere,
I believe u.s. law has diverged from a broader
u.s. commitment to and trend toward a more
principled approach to membership. But it is
not too late to correct the course of employment rights distribution. Indeed, commentators from both ends of the political spectrum
are calling for an overhaul of our immigration
policy. My hope is that analyzing the undocumented worker through the lens of member-

ship may help illuminate the difficult path
that lies ahead as the United States engages in
immigration reform and makes difficult decisions about who belongs and what belonging
here means.
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